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Program?
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R. Paul Duncan
Objective. To determine the impact of Florida’s Medicaid Demonstration 4 years
post-implementation on per member per month (PMPM) Medicaid expenditures and
whether receiving care through HMOs versus provider service networks (PSNs) in the
Demonstration was associated with PMPM expenditures.
Data. Florida Medicaid claims from two ﬁscal years prior to implementation of the
Demonstration (FY0405, FY0506) and the ﬁrst four ﬁscal years after implementation
(FY0607-FY0910) from two urban Demonstration counties and two urban non-Dem-
onstration counties.
Study Design. A difference-in-difference approach was used to compare changes in
enrollee expenditures before and after implementation of the Demonstration overall
and speciﬁcally for HMOs and PSNs.
Data Extraction. Claims data were extracted for enrollees in the Demonstration and
non-Demonstration counties and collapsed into monthly amounts (N = 26,819,987
person-months).
Principal Findings. Among SSI enrollees, the Demonstration resulted in lower
increases in PMPM expenditures over time ($40) compared with the non-Demonstra-
tion counties ($186), with Demonstration PSNs lowering PMPM expenditures by $7
more than HMOs. Savings were also seen among TANF enrollees but to a lesser
extent.
Conclusions. The Medicaid Demonstration in Florida appears to result in lower
PMPM expenditures. Demonstration PSNs generated slightly greater reductions in
expenditures compared to Demonstration HMOs. PSNs appear to be a promising
model for delivering care toMedicaid enrollees.
Key Words. Administrative data uses, health care costs, Medicaid, health care
organizations and systems
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Medicaid programs struggle to control costs andmany are experimenting with
alternative delivery models. The Affordable Care Act includes several provi-
sions related to Medicaid, such as Accountable Care Organizations, Medicaid
Health Homes, bundled payments, and community-based collaborative care
networks (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). For decades, Florida’s Medic-
aid program has experimented with different reforms (Duncan et al. 2008),
including the development of contractual relationships with organizations that
include many of the functions and activities now envisioned for accountable
care organizations (ACOs) and community-based collaborative networks.
Through the past decade, these piloted models have converged into the cur-
rent provider service networks (PSNs), and they are active in ﬁve counties
through a Section 1115 waiver (Coughlin et al. 2008; Landry, Lemak, and
Hall 2011). The waiver included risk-adjustment to HMO capitation rates and
authorizing the PSN as option enrollees could select as their managed care
organization (Agency for Health Care Administration 2005). Since 2005, Flor-
ida PSNs have been paid on a discounted fee-for-service basis with shared sav-
ings. Approximately 300,000 enrollees receive care through a mix of
Medicaid HMOs and PSNs in the Demonstration being conducted through
the waiver.
The Florida Medicaid PSNs share many of the accountable care attri-
butes identiﬁed in the literature and can be considered “ACO-like” organiza-
tions, speciﬁcally: the provision of care across a continuum to a deﬁned
population, the ability to support comprehensive performance measurement,
the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc performance targets, payment mechanisms that
encourage quality improvements and cost reduction, strong primary care
medical home base, prospective planning, and health information technology
to support care coordination and quality improvement (Coughlin et al. 2008;
Devers and Berenson 2009; Shortell, Casalino, and Fisher 2010). Like ACOs,
each PSN is responsible for a deﬁned patient population and held accountable
for cost and quality performance. The organizational, ﬁnancial, and legal
requirements of the PSNs are nearly identical to those for Medicare Shared
Savings ACOs and Pioneer ACOs. The state pays PSNs a per member per
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month administrative fee and pays PSN providers on a fee-for-service basis. If
PSNs achieve cost savings in a particular time period, they receive additional
payments (a portion of the savings). If PSNs do not achieve cost savings, they
must return a portion of the administrative fees. Thus, PSNs are at risk for the
administrative fees, not the total cost of care. This is similar in some ways to
the Medicare Shared Savings ACO model in which ACOs share savings but
are not at risk for losses (one-sided risk). Unlike ACOs, PSNs are not yet
accountable for total cost of care and payments are not tied to quality perfor-
mance. Like the ACO approach, however, the original PSN legislation called
for PSNs to move to risk-adjusted capitation after a 3-year transition period
(the same language is used for Pioneer ACOs). Subsequent Florida legislation
allowed PSNs to remain fee-for-service. So far, no PSNs have moved to risk-
adjusted capitation and no payments are based on quality performance mea-
sures. The PSNs are all not-for-proﬁt entities that operate only in Florida and
only enroll Medicaid beneﬁciaries.
Their parent organizations are either safety-net hospitals or large physi-
cian group practices that predominately serveMedicaid patients. In summary,
PSNs share some of the features of ACOs and the experience in Florida over
the past several years is likely to be informative for the initial years of the
Medicare ACOmodels being implemented nationally.
In addition to the PSNs, Florida Medicaid beneﬁciaries in the Demon-
stration counties can choose Medicaid HMOs, which are paid a risk-adjusted
monthly premium to provide all care to enrollees. The experience in Florida
Medicaid provides an opportunity to examine these different organizational
models (HMOvs. PSN).
Differences in organization structure, reimbursement approach, owner-
ship, and populations served could result in differences in expenditures across
the two plan types. In particular, the PSN model is similar to many emerging
ACOs, in that providers (either safety-net hospital systems or physician net-
works) are the owners and drivers of these plans. In addition, the PSN ﬁnancial
approach includes discounted fee-for-service payments with shared savings
potential. Finally, in these organizations, quality measures were required and
publicly reported by plan name and county during the demonstration.
Across the rest of the state, Medicaid beneﬁciaries can also choose a
Medicaid HMO or enroll in a primary care case management program
(PCCM), called MediPass. Care for enrollees in MediPass is provided on a
fee-for-service basis, with primary care providers serving as gatekeepers
( Johnson et al. 2010). However, the gatekeeper function under MediPass is
relatively minimal (compared with that in HMOs) as there are essentially no
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incentives for primary care providers to monitor referrals for specialty and
other care. The HMOs in non-Demonstration counties are not paid risk-
adjusted premiums as they are in the Demonstration counties. So, in the non-
Demonstration counties, MediPass and HMOs are not subject to the same
reimbursement mechanisms as in the Demonstration counties and, conse-
quently, may have higher expenditures. Table 1 includes a summary of the
characteristics of Florida PSNs, Medicaid HMOs, andMediPass.
A previous study examining Florida’s Medicaid’s Demonstration com-
pared per member per month (PMPM) expenditures in the Demonstration
counties with those in non-Demonstration counties 2 years after implementa-
tion and found no signiﬁcant impact of the Demonstration on PMPM expen-
ditures (Harman et al. 2011), but it did not look at the effect of enrolling in a
PSN versus an HMO in the Demonstration counties. In this study, we use a
similar analytic approach to examine changes in PMPM expenditures 4 years
after implementation for all Demonstration plans and speciﬁcally between
PSNs and HMOs in the urban Demonstration counties and compare those
changes in expenditures to those observed in two matched non-Demonstra-
tion counties.
METHODS
Analytic Approach
The analytic approach for this study was to compare changes in expenditures
in the Demonstration counties to changes in expenditures in two comparable
counties that were not participating in the Demonstration. This difference-in-
difference approach takes into account changes in Medicaid expenditures that
may have been occurring regardless of the Demonstration. The expenditures
examined only include direct payments for medical care or capitates premi-
ums and do not include administrative costs incurred by Florida’s Agency for
Health Care Administration (AHCA). Changes in expenditures between the
baseline period, which is deﬁned as the two ﬁscal years before the implemen-
tation of the Demonstration (FY0405 and FY0506), and the ﬁrst 4 years of the
Demonstration (FY0607 through FY0910) in the two urban Demonstration
counties of Broward and Duval were measured and compared with changes in
two other Florida urban counties, Hillsborough and Orange Counties (the
“non-Demonstration counties”) over the same time period. Duval County is
in Northeast Florida and is the location of Jacksonville. Broward County
includes urban communities north of Miami, such as Fort Lauderdale and
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Table 1: Comparing PSN, HMO, andMediPass Models
PSN HMO MediPass
Business Case ExistingMedicaid
provider networks take
on insurance functions
and direct care for
patients; costs saved
without insurer/third
party
Firms assemble
networks and care
management models
to increase quality
and reduce costs
using capitated
payment model
Support primary care
physician role in
managing care for
patients
Beneﬁciary
Choice
Could choose PSNor
HMOor would be
assigned
Could choose PSNor
HMOor would be
assigned
Not an option in
Reform counties
Beneﬁciary
Eligibility
Categories
Required for TANF and
SSI. Optional for
others
Required for TANF
and SSI. Optional for
others
All eligibility
categories
Beneﬁts Standard FLMedicaid
Beneﬁt; could not
customize beneﬁts or
copayments
Standard FLMedicaid
Beneﬁt plus
opportunity to revise
annually in limited
areas (must verify
sufﬁciency and
actuarial
equivalency)
Standard FL
Medicaid Beneﬁt;
could not
customize beneﬁts
or copayments
Geographic
Region
5 Counties (2 urban; 3
rural)
Statewide (not all
counties)
Statewide (all
counties)
MCOOwnership Florida only; not-for-
proﬁt only; Safety Net
Hospital Systems,
Physician Networks
Varied, including
multistate ﬁrms,
publicly traded, and
not-for-proﬁt,
diversiﬁed product
lines
Federal/state
government
PaymentModel:
State toMCO
Fee-for-service to
providers;
Administrative fees
(PMPM) toMCO
Risk-adjusted,
capitated payments
toMCO
Fee-for-service to
providers; case
management fee to
Primary Care
Physicians
(PMPM)
PaymentModel:
MCO to
Providers
Fee-for-service directly
to individual providers
(none at risk)
Varies: capitated and
FFS (some at risk)
Fee-for-service
directly to
providers. None at
risk
Risk One-sided risk (for
Administrative Fees
Only based on cost
savings)
Full risk after 3 years
of pilot (risk
corridors during pilot
phase)
None
continued
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Hollywood. Orange County is located in central Florida and includes the city
of Orlando. Hillsborough County is located in the central west section of Flor-
ida and includes the city of Tampa. The urbanity, population size, and demo-
graphics of Hillsborough and Orange Counties are generally similar to those
of Broward and Duval Counties.
The non-Demonstration counties are also comparable in terms of their
Medicaid programs and enrollment characteristics during the period immedi-
ately preceding the Demonstration, although the non-Demonstration counties
have a higher percentage of African American enrollees and a lower percentage
of Latino enrollees (see Table 2). Hillsborough and Orange Counties do not
have PSNmarket penetration. In the comparisons,MediPass enrollment is used
as a proxy for PSN enrollment, as both are paid on an FFS basis. Enrollees in
Duval did not have a PSN plan option until the Medicaid Demonstration was
implemented in September 2006. For the 2 years before the Demonstration,
the HMO market penetration rate for both the Demonstration and non-Dem-
onstration counties was over 50 percent, with the non-Demonstration counties
having a slightly higher HMO presence. Compared with the non-Demonstra-
tion counties, Demonstration counties had a slightly higher MediPass/PSN
enrollment, partly due to the absence of PSNs in the non-Demonstration coun-
ties. In general, the proportion of HMO and PSN/MediPass enrollment for the
Demonstration counties was similar to the two non-Demonstration counties for
both years before the Demonstration program began.
Data
To calculate baseline expenditures, all facility, medical, and pharmacy claims
or analogous HMO capitation payment amounts were obtained for all
Table 1. Continued
PSN HMO MediPass
Quality
Monitoring
CAHPS, HEDIS, and
HEDIS-like measures
reported publicly by
PSN; QI program
required
CAHPS, HEDIS and
HEDIS-like
measures reported
publicly byHMO;
QI program required
CAHPS data
reported publicly
in aggregate
annually
Market Share in
Pilot Counties
2006–2010
29–46% 54–71% NA in Pilot Counties
CAHPS, Consumer Assessment of Health Plans; HEDIS, Health Effectiveness Data and Informa-
tion Set; MCO,Managed CareOrganization; QI, quality improvement.
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Medicaid enrollees who lived at least 1 month in Broward or Duval County
and were in an eligibility category that would have made them eligible to par-
ticipate in the Demonstration had it existed during FY0405 or FY0506. This
included individuals with eligibility based on Supplemental Social Security
Income (SSI) and children and families with eligibility through Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Individuals eligible through SSI or
TANF are considered mandatory participants in the Demonstration. Certain
individuals, including dually eligible forMedicare andMedicaid and pregnant
women, were not required to participate in the demonstration but could vol-
untarily participate. To ensure genuine comparability, those enrollee months
where individuals were voluntarily eligible for waiver and/or special services
(e.g., AIDS waiver, Statewide Inpatient Psychiatric Program services, etc.) or
included retroactive eligibility were not included in the calculations. In addi-
tion, children who received services through a special program for children
with special health care needs were excluded from the calculations. Because
many individuals moved in and out of Duval and Broward Counties and/or
changed eligibility during this time, only those months where the individual
lived in one of the Demonstration counties and was in a Demonstration eligi-
ble category were used to calculate baseline PMPM expenditures.
The analysis used a person-month approach, meaning each observation
corresponds to expenditures by a person in a month. Therefore, each individ-
ual could contribute up to 24 member months used in the baseline calcula-
tions (one for each month of the two ﬁscal years; mean = 6.4 months). Using
this method, the ﬁnal baseline cohort from Broward and Duval Counties
included 5,152,099 member months, with 656,855 eligible through SSI (36
percent enrolled in HMO, 60 percent enrolled in PCCM, and 4 percent in
FFS) and 4,495,244 eligible through TANF (50 percent enrolled in HMO, 48
percent enrolled in PCCM, and 2 percent in FFS). To calculate expenditures
for the Demonstration period, all payments made to HMOs and PSNs for
Demonstration enrollees who were enrolled for at least 1 month during the
period between FY0607 and FY0910 (the ﬁrst 4 years of the Demonstration)
were included. For PSNs, PMPM expenditures were the sum of all paid
amounts for claims in a given month, including a monthly patient case man-
agement fee paid to PSN providers, whereas for HMOs, the PMPM expendi-
tures were simply the monthly risk-adjusted capitated premiums. Months
where individuals were eligible for waiver and/or special services or which
included retroactive eligibility were not included in the baseline or Demon-
stration calculations. As with the baseline data, each observation corresponds
to expenditures for a person in a month, meaning each individual could
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contribute up to 46 member months (mean = 9.1 months) in the calculations
(the Demonstration health plans did not begin enrolling individuals until Sep-
tember 1, 2006). In the ﬁrst year of the Demonstration, the Medicaid popula-
tion in the Demonstration counties was transitioned over a period of several
months into Demonstration health plans. The transition was completed in
April 2007 (Duncan et al. 2011). This resulted in a ﬁnal reform cohort of
7,358,380 member months from FY0607 to FY0910 combined, with 913,633
eligible through SSI (59 percent enrolled in HMO and 41 percent in PSN)
and 6,444,747 eligible through TANF (69 percent enrolled in HMO and 31
percent in PSN).
Overall time trends for the Medicaid expenditures were accounted for
by including expenditures for enrollees in the selected non-Demonstration
counties. The same selection criteria for enrollees and services used for the cal-
culation of PMPM expenditures in the Demonstration counties were used to
calculate PMPM expenditures for enrollees in the non-Demonstration coun-
ties. For non-Demonstration counties, individuals had an average of
5.3 months of eligibility during the baseline period and 10.8 months during
the Demonstration period. This resulted in a ﬁnal non-Demonstration cohort
of 4,768,599 member months for FY0405-FY0506, with 762,920 eligible
through SSI (51 percent enrolled in HMO and 49 percent in PCCM) and
4,005,679 eligible through TANF (61 percent enrolled in HMO and 39 per-
cent enrolled in PCCM/FFS), and 9,713,330 member months for FY0607-
FY0910, with 1,617,095 eligible through SSI (57 percent enrolled in HMO
and 43 percent enrolled in PCCM/FFS) and 8,096,235 enrolled through
TANF (69 percent enrolled in HMO and 31 percent enrolled in PCCM/FFS).
Statistical Analysis
First, unadjusted differences in average PMPMexpenditures between the Dem-
onstration period and the baseline period were calculated for PSN and HMO
enrollees combined and separately for the Demonstration counties and the
non-Demonstration counties, and then the difference in the difference (Demon-
stration counties’ difference minus non-Demonstration counties’ difference)
was calculated. These differences were calculated separately for SSI and TANF
enrollees and calculations were done on the full population and with the top 5
percent of observations removed to diminish the inﬂuence of outliers.
The subjects (cohorts) are a complete database of the eligible Medicaid
enrollees germane to this analytic question, as distinct from a random sample.
We examine the change in average expenditures for all eligible enrollees in
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the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties, in the baseline and
Demonstration period and not an individual’s expenditure change over time.
It was not practical to examine individual changes over time because of the
high rate of turnover among Medicaid enrollees. Examining individual
changes over time would greatly limit the cohort size and the ability to gener-
alize the results.
Next, a series of multivariate analyses were conducted to better under-
stand the pattern of changes in expenditures after controlling for any differ-
ences in age, race, or gender between the non-Demonstration and
Demonstration counties, as well as differences between HMO and PSN enrol-
lees. The models also included the individual’s risk score as a covariate, to
control for differences in health status between enrollees in the Demonstration
and non-Demonstration counties and between PSNs and HMOs in the Dem-
onstration counties. These scores were calculated using the Medicaid Rx
methodology, which measures health status using pharmacy claims (http://
medicaidrx.ucsd.edu/), and used by Florida’s Medicaid program to risk-adjust
capitation rates to HMOs, but were calculated for enrollees in the Demonstra-
tion and non-Demonstration counties during the Demonstration period. As
with the univariate analysis, the multivariate analysis used a difference-in-
difference approach. These analyses examined whether the change in per
member per month expenditures over time signiﬁcantly differed between the
Demonstration versus non-Demonstration counties with both combined and
separate estimates for PSN versus HMO enrollment in the Demonstration
counties. The data were highly skewed with long tails and a log transformation
did not allow the data to approach normality. As a result, several different
panel data models were estimated to determine whichmodel achieved the best
ﬁt. The models estimated included both one-part and two-part models, gener-
alized estimating equations (GEE) using a gamma family with a log link, a log-
linear random effects regression, and linear regression using untransformed
PMPM expenditures, but with the top 5 percent of observations removed to
reduce skewness and kurtosis. Because expenditures were calculated on a
PMPM basis, the unit of analysis is a person-month. Thus, an individual could
provide up to 70 observations to the analyses. All models used the XT proce-
dures of Stata 10.0 to account for correlation of observations over time (Stata-
Corp 2007). The one-part GEE model using the gamma family with a log link
and random effects displayed adequate model ﬁt and although this model does
not have the same precision as a log-linear model in the presence of long tails,
it produces consistent estimates and precision is not a serious issue given the
extremely large cohort size used in the analysis (Manning and Mullahy 2001).
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Thus, the results presented focus on the one-part gamma regression models
that included all observations (i.e., top 5 percent included).
The model that combined HMO and PSN enrollees includes a variable
for time (“time” coded as months 1 through 70), a dummy variable for whether
the observation was from the Demonstration period of FY0607-FY0910
(referred to as “post”), a dummy variable indicating whether the observation
was from one of the counties that participated in the Demonstration (referred
to as “reformcounty”), an interaction of time and post (time*post), an interac-
tion of time and a dummy variable indicating enrollment in a Demonstration
(time*reformcounty), a dummy variable indicating that the observation was
from the postperiod and a Demonstration county (post*reformcounty), and
an interaction of time, postperiod, and Demonstration enrollment
(time*post*reformcounty). This model estimates separate slopes for baseline
and Demonstration periods for both the Demonstration and non-Demonstra-
tion counties and speciﬁcally tests whether the differences in slopes to the
baseline period and the postimplementation period of the Demonstration is
different from those for the non-Demonstration counties (indicated by the
coefﬁcient for time*post*reformcounty). The model also indicates whether
there was a shift in the intercept in the Demonstration counties once the Dem-
onstration was implemented (indicated by the coefﬁcients for post*reformco-
unty). The estimated equation is as follows:
PMPM Expendituresit ¼ expðb0 þ Timet  b1 þ Posti  b2 þ Reformcountyi
 b3 þ Timet Posti  b4 þ Timet Reform countyi
 b5 þ Posti Reformcountyi  b6 þ Timet Posti
Reformcountyi  b7 þ RiskScore  b8 þ Age  b9
þGender  b10 þ Race  b11 þ it Þ
where eit follows a gamma distribution and “exp” signiﬁes the log link. Thus,
b6 indicates the difference in the intercept for the period after implementation
of the Demonstration for observations from Demonstration counties and b7
tests whether the change in the slope pre- and postimplementation of the
Demonstration was signiﬁcantly different for the Demonstration counties than
for the observations from the non-Demonstration counties. This equation was
estimated separately for enrollees in SSI and TANF.
To examine whether the impact of the demonstration on PMPM expen-
ditures signiﬁcantly differed for enrollees in Demonstration HMOs versus
PSNs, a second model was estimated that was similar to the previous equation
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except that separate slopes and intercepts were estimated for PSN andHMO:
PMPM Expendituresit ¼ expðb0 þ Timet  b1 þ Posti  b2 þ Reformcountyi
 b3 þ Timet Posti  b4 þ Timet PSNi  b5 þ Timet
HMOi  b6 þ Posti PSNi  b7 þ Posti HMOi  b8
þ Timet Posti PSNi  b9 þ Timet Posti HMOi
 b10 þ RiskScore  b11 þ Age  b12 þGender
 b13 þ Race  b14 þ it Þ
Thus, b7 and b8 indicate the difference in the intercept for the period
after implementation of the Demonstration for observations from Demonstra-
tion PSNs and HMOs and b9 and b10 tests whether the change in the slope
pre- and postimplementation of the Demonstration was signiﬁcantly different
for the Demonstration PSNs and HMOs than for the observations from the
non-Demonstration counties.
Next, the estimated equation was used to predict PMPM expenditure in
the pre- and postimplementation of Demonstration period for both non-Dem-
onstration enrollees and for all enrollees in the Demonstration counties and
then separately for enrollees in Demonstration PSNs and HMOs. The
approach taken was to assume that everyone in the population (enrollees in
non-Demonstration and Demonstration counties) was either in the Demon-
stration county or non-Demonstration county for the ﬁrst model and in the
Demonstration PSNs or HMOs or in the non-Demonstration counties in the
second model and then predict expenditures for each of the time periods. This
allows the demographics to be identical for the estimation cohorts and simu-
lates what would have happened if everyone were either in a non-Demonstra-
tion plan or everyone was in a Demonstration PSN and/or HMO. The
difference in predicted expenditures pre- and postimplementation is then cal-
culated for Demonstration all together and for PSN and HMO groups and the
non-Demonstration groups separately and then the difference of this differ-
ence is calculated between the Demonstration counties together and sepa-
rately for PSNs andHMOs and in the non-Demonstration counties.
RESULTS
There were some differences in the demographics and health status between
Medicaid enrollees in HMOs and PSNs in the Demonstration counties. For
SSI enrollees in the Demonstration counties, 26.3 percent were African
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American in HMOs compared to 11.5 percent in PSNs, and 21.4 percent were
classiﬁed as a race other than Caucasian or African American in HMOs com-
pared to 8.8 percent in PSNs. SSI enrollees in HMOs were also slightly youn-
ger on average compared with PSNs (33.5 vs. 35.5) and had lower risk scores
on average (0.32 vs. 0.77). The enrollees were similar in the proportion of
Latino enrollees (2.6 percent vs. 2.1 percent) and in the proportion that were
male (50.1 percent vs. 51.1 percent). For TANFenrollees in the Demonstration
counties, 35.4 percent were African American in HMOs compared to 13.4
percent in PSNs, 10.8 percent of HMO enrollees were Latino compared to 3.9
percent of PSN enrollees, and 5.1 percent of HMO enrollees were classiﬁed as
other race compared to 1.5 percent of PSN enrollees. TANF-HMO enrollees
also had lower risk scores on average than PSN enrollees (0.20 vs. 0.44).
TANF enrollees were similar in terms of age (10.9 vs. 10.3) and male gender
(44.6 percent vs. 45.5 percent).
Before adjusting for differences in the enrollee populations between the
Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties, it appears that average
PMPM expenditures were better controlled in the Demonstration counties
than the non-Demonstration counties, with the largest difference observed
among PSN enrollees (see Table 3). The change in PMPM expenditures for
Table 3: Unadjusted Changes in PMPM Expenditures
Broward/Duval
Hillsborough/
Orange
Difference-
In-Difference
Demonstration
Counties
Non-
Demonstration
Counties
Demonstration—
Non-
Demonstration
SSI TANF SSI TANF SSI TANF
All plans
Baseline 865 131 683 126 263 35
Demonstration 764 118 845 148
Demonstration-Baseline 101 13 162 22
HMO
Baseline 668 126 512 118 150 31
Demonstration 676 115 670 138
Demonstration-Baseline 8 11 158 20
PSNandMediPass
Baseline 982 137 860 139 279 36
Demonstration 889 126 1046 154
Demonstration-Baseline 93 11 186 15
PMPM, per member per month. Baseline period is FY0405 and FY0506. Demonstration period
is FY0607 through FY0910.
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SSI enrollees in the Demonstration counties was $263 less than the change in
PMPM expenditures in the non-Demonstration counties. When looking at
Demonstration HMO and PSN enrollees separately, the change in PMPM
expenditures for SSI enrollees in HMOs in the Demonstration counties was
$150 less than the change in PMPM expenditure for similar enrollees in
HMOs in the non-Demonstration counties, whereas the change in PMPM
expenditures for SSI enrollees in PSNs in the Demonstration counties was
$279 less than the change in PMPM expenditures for similar MediPass enrol-
lees in the non-Demonstration counties. The change in PMPM expenditures
for all TANF enrollees in the Demonstration counties was $35 less than the
change in the non-Demonstration counties. The change in PMPM expendi-
ture for TANF enrollees in HMOs in the Demonstration counties was $31 less
than the change for TANF-HMO enrollees in the non-Demonstration coun-
ties, whereas the change in PMPM expenditures for TANF-PSN enrollees in
the Demonstration counties was $36 less than the change for TANF-MediPass
enrollees in the non-Demonstration counties.
Relative reductions in expected expenditures remain after adjusting for
demographic differences (p < .001 in all cases; see Figure 1), although the
magnitude of the difference between the Demonstration and non-Demonstra-
tion counties is not as large as the unadjusted differences, with PMPM expen-
ditures for SSI enrollees increasing by $40 in the Demonstration counties, but
increasing by $186 in the non-Demonstration counties (see Figure 1). Expen-
ditures for enrollees in Demonstration HMOs increased by $40 and increased
by $33 for enrollees in Demonstration PSNs (see Table 4). Thus, for SSI
enrollees, PSNs appear to be reducing expenditures by $153 compared to the
Figure 1: Change in Adjusted PerMember PerMonth Expenditures
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non-Demonstration counties and HMOs appear to be reducing expenditures
by $146. Similarly, PMPM expenditures for TANF enrollees decreased by $1
for HMO enrollees in the Demonstration counties and decreased by $4 for
PSN enrollees in the Demonstration counties, but increased by $28 in the
non-Demonstration counties (see Table 5). For TANF enrollees, PSNs appear
to be reducing expenditures by $32 compared to the non-Demonstration
counties, whereas HMOs appear to be reducing expenditures by $29 com-
pared to the non-Demonstration counties. The multivariate analysis showed
that the Demonstration initially increased average PMPM expenditures for
SSI enrollees, as shown by the positive coefﬁcients for post*HMO and
post*PSN (p < .001 in both cases), but that there was a downward trend in
expenditures over time for both PSN and HMO enrollees, as shown by the
negative coefﬁcients for time*post*HOM and time*post*PSN (p < .001 in
both cases) compared to the non-Demonstration counties, suggesting that the
Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of Per Member Per Month Expenditures for
SSI Enrollees
Coefﬁcient 95% CI p-value
Time .0058 .0050 .0065 <.001
Post .1672 .1474 .1871 <.001
Reform .2176 .1968 .2384 <.001
Time*Post .0054 .0063 .0045 <.001
Time*HMO .0027 .0039 .0014 <.001
Time*PSN .0004 .0007 .0015 .476
Post*PSN .1119 .0701 .1538 <.001
Post*HMO 1.3582 1.3199 1.3965 <.001
Time*Post*PSN .0082 .0096 .0067 <.001
Time*Post*HMO .0316 .0331 .0301 <.001
Risk score .0251 .0224 .0279 <.001
Male .0204 .0068 .0340 .003
Race/ethnicity
White (reference) – – – –
Black .2308 .2497 .2118 <.001
Latino .1784 .2005 .1563 <.001
Other race .2344 .2523 .2165 <.001
Age
Age <1 1.2415 1.1966 1.2863 <.001
Age 1–5 .5059 .5289 .4828 <.001
Age 6–13 .8746 .8906 .8585 <.001
Age 14–20 .7274 .7423 .7125 <.001
Age 21–54 (reference) – – – –
Age 55–64 .0497 .0651 .0343 <.001
Age 65+ .3588 .3881 .3294 <.001
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Demonstration was able to “bend the cost curve.” Similar ﬁndings, but with
smaller magnitudes, were observed for the TANF enrollees, although there
was no shift in intercept for PSNs (p = .238), with downward trends observed
over time for both PSNs andHMOs (p < .001 in both cases).
An additional analysis was conducted that was limited to only those
individuals with at least 3 or 6 months of Medicaid eligibility in both the pre-
Demonstration period ( July 1, 2004—June 30 2006) and Demonstration per-
iod (September 1, 2006—July 1, 2010). This was done to determine if the
impact of the Demonstration was different among those individuals with
more stable Medicaid enrollment. When limited to these individuals, it
appears that the Demonstration counties controlled costs better than the non-
Demonstration counties for both the SSI and TANF populations, although
the cost reductions were smaller among SSI enrollees compare with the full
cohort ($67 vs $205), and were larger for the TANF population ($54 vs $32).
Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of Per Person Per Month Expenditures for
TANF Enrollees
Coefﬁcient 95% CI p-value
Time .0027 .0021 .0032 <.001
Post .0924 .0788 .1061 <.001
Reform .0860 .0745 .0975 <.001
Time*Post .0016 .0022 .0010 <.001
Time*HMO .0004 .0004 .0012 .357
Time*PSN .0018 .0026 .0010 <.001
Post*PSN .0180 .0478 .0118 .238
Post*HMO 1.4806 1.4579 1.5033 <.001
Time*Post*PSN .0030 .0040 .0021 <.001
Time*Post*HMO .0358 .0367 .0349 <.001
Male .0573 .0623 .0522 <.001
Risk score .0387 .0363 .0411 <.001
Race/ethnicity
White (reference) – – –
Black .2041 .2114 .1968 –
Latino .1322 .1404 .1241 <.001
Other race .2033 .2152 .1914 <.001
Age
Age <1 .3323 .3235 .3411 <.001
Age 1–5 .7591 .7665 .7516 <.001
Age 6–13 .9394 .9469 .9320 <.001
Age 14–20 .6157 .6241 .6073 <.001
Age 21–54 (reference) – – – –
Age 55–64 .3396 .2910 .3881 <.001
Age 65+ .2230 .0607 .5066 .123
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Detailed results are not presented here, but they are available from the
authors upon request.
DISCUSSION
It appears that both HMOs and PSNs participating in the Medicaid Demon-
stration counties in Florida are controlling PMPM expenditures better than
the non-Demonstration counties, lowering expenditures by approximately
$200 PMPM for SSI enrollees and by approximately $30 PMPM for TANF
enrollees. In addition, Demonstration PSNs are generating slightly larger
reductions in expenditures than Demonstration HMOs. Although PSNs had
only marginally greater reductions in expenditures relative to HMOs in the
Demonstration counties, previous studies have shown that the PSNs in the
Demonstration counties also had slightly greater levels of enrollee satisfaction
with their health care, health plan, personal doctor, and with specialty care
compared with Demonstration HMOs (Duncan et al. 2010).
An earlier analysis of Florida’s Medicaid Demonstration found essen-
tially no impact in PMPM expenditures when examining expenditures during
the ﬁrst 2 years postimplementation of Florida’s Medicaid Demonstration
(Harman et al. 2011). Given the relatively large savings observed in this analy-
sis of 4 years after Florida’s Medicaid Demonstration implementation, it
appears that it may take several years before cost reductions can be realized.
This concept is supported by the multivariate models, which consistently
demonstrated an initial increase in expenditures in the Demonstration coun-
ties (i.e., an upward shift in the intercept), but bent the cost curve downward,
lowering the rate of increase in expenditures compared with the non-Demon-
stration counties. However, it will be important to continue to examine expen-
ditures to determine if the current observed trends continue.
In addition, this analysis has some important limitations that must be
considered when interpreting the results. First, this study only examined
expenditures for direct care and capitated premiums, and it did not examine
utilization of speciﬁc services. Therefore, it is not known if the observed reduc-
tions in expenditures were due tomore efﬁcient provision of care or by limiting
access to care. At the time of this study, encounter data from HMOs were not
available to examine patterns of utilization. Further research is necessary to
learn more about exactly how the observed reductions in expenditures were
achieved. This study also did not include the administrative costs incurred by
the AHCA, which administers Florida’s Medicaid program. However,
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payments made by AHCA to PSNs, HMOs, andMediPass providers for man-
agement ofMedicaid enrollees were included in the calculations. Also, the data
do not include out-of-pocket payments by enrollees, so it is not possible to know
if theDemonstration changed out-of-pocket cost burden in this population.
An additional limitation is that this analysis did not measure changes in
expenditures for individual enrollees, pre- and post-Demonstration implemen-
tation. The PMPM expenditure calculations during the pre-Demonstration
period refer to enrollees during that time period, a different group of individu-
als than those who are the basis for calculating PMPM expenditures in the
post-Demonstration period. In addition, because individuals selected into
plans and were not randomized, there is the potential for selection bias. There
were some observed differences in demographics and risk scores between
HMOs and PSNs and the non-Demonstration counties, and case mix might
have varied over these periods. Given that there were differences in observed
variables, it is likely that there were also some differences in unobserved char-
acteristics that were related to both choice of health plan and expenditures.
However, given that the analyses were limited to individuals enrolled in Med-
icaid through SSI and TANF, the same exclusion criteria were applied in all
time periods, the multivariate analyses controlled for demographics and risk
scores, and a difference-in-difference approach is used, it is unlikely that case
mix and other differences in unobserved factors are driving these results.
Although these limitations exist, this study demonstrates that 4 years
into the Demonstration project in Florida’s Medicaid program, reductions in
expenditures are being achieved. The slightly greater reductions in expendi-
tures among PSNs combined with better patient experiences among PSN
enrollees relative to HMO enrollees found in an earlier study (Duncan et al.
2010) point to PSNs as a promising model for delivering care to Medicaid
enrollees. Exactly why PSNs perform differently remains unclear at this point.
Further research can uncover the extent to which the organizational structure,
mission, and payment arrangements are directly or indirectly linked to lower
expenditures. It will be important to continue to monitor the program to see if
lower expenditures are maintained and also to determine how reductions in
expenditures are being achieved.
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